

















































evolve	 culturally	 and	whether	 they	 generalize	 from	 one	 setting	 to	 another,	 we	 conducted	 an	







the	 generalization	 of	 norms.	 Retaining	 their	 group	 affiliations	 from	 Part	 1,	 each	 child	 had	 to	
distribute	resources	between	an	in-group	member	and	an	out-group	member.	Children	of	both	
age	 groups	 in	 symmetric	 treatments	 used	 our	 suggestions	 about	 how	 to	 play	 the	 game	 to	
coordinate	 in	 Part	 1.	 In	 asymmetric	 treatments,	 children	 followed	 our	 suggestions	 less	
consistently,	which	reduced	coordination	but	moderated	inequality.	In	Part	2,	older	children	did	









this	 sense	 the	 individuals	 involved	 have	 a	 shared	 interest	 in	 collaborating.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
exchange	usually	involves	a	distributional	conflict	(Bowles,	2009)	and	dealing	with	this	conflict	
can	 destroy	 the	 gains	 from	 trade	 or	 prevent	 exchange	 altogether	 (Bowles,	 2009;	 De	 Dreu,	
Beersma,	Steinel,	&	Kleef,	2007;	Raiffa,	2002;	Young	&	Burke,	2001;	Young	&	Raiffa,	1983).	 In	
effect,	 the	parties’	 interests	are	neither	 fully	congruent	nor	 fully	opposed,	but	 they	are	mixed.	
Particularly,	the	parties	involved	face	a	coordination	problem	(Bramoullé,	2007).	They	can	divide	
up	 the	 gains	 from	 social	 exchange	 in	 different	 ways,	 but	 they	 have	 to	 agree.	 Most	 potential	
agreements,	however,	favor	one	party	over	the	other,	and	anticipating	this	tension	may	prevent	
agreement	altogether.	





remarkably	 uniform	 in	 local	 areas.	 If	 so,	 the	 norm	 dominates	 the	 question	 of	who	 gets	what.	
Resource	distribution	is	bizarrely	insensitive,	for	example,	to	the	fact	that	land	holdings,	and	by	
extension	 the	 land	 owner’s	 bargaining	 power,	 vary	 in	 terms	 of	 soil	 fertility.	 In	 effect,	 when	
considering	how	to	distribute,	farmers	and	land	owners	simply	give	up,	defer	to	the	norm,	and	get	











Zaid,	 Ahmed,	 Fehr,	 &	 Efferson,	 2016).	 Once	 a	 cutting	 norm	 is	 in	 place,	 parents	 face	 strong	
incentives	to	cut	 their	daughters	 to	 improve	 the	 future	marriage	prospects	of	 these	daughters	
(Camilotti,	2016;	Efferson,	Vogt,	Elhadi,	Ahmed,	&	Fehr,	2015;	Efferson	et	al.,	2020;	Howard	&	
Gibson,	2019;	Platteau	&	Auriol,	2018;	Shell-Duncan,	Wander,	Hernlund,	&	Moreau,	2011;	Vogt	et	
al.,	 2016).	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 such	 a	 coordination	 norm	 evolves,	 it	 shifts	 the	 distribution	 of	
reproductive	 benefits	 away	 from	 women	 and	 toward	 men,	 once	 again	 with	 the	 potential	 to	
entrench	status	differentials	that	spill	over	to	other	 types	of	social	exchange	(Henrich	&	Boyd,	
2008).	











can	 be	 inequitable,	 as	 one	 party	 is	 underprivileged	 relative	 to	 another,	 and	 inequality	 can	
accumulate	when	underprivilege	persists	over	time	and	generalizes	across	contexts.	
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	 In	spite	of	 these	diverse	and	 far-reaching	social	effects	hypothesized	 to	attend	cultural	




	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 norm	 generalization	 question,	 the	 central	 challenge	 is	methodological.	
Namely,	 how	 do	 we	 identify	 when	 a	 norm	 that	 evolved	 in	 one	 domain	 generalizes	 to	 shape	
behavior	in	another	domain?	Researchers	typically	cannot	do	so	without	some	control	over	the	










from	 sharecropping	 to	 social	 encounters	 in	 town,	 but	 we	 cannot	 conclude	 this	 from	 our	
observations.	Another	very	different	possibility	is	equally	plausible.	To	illustrate,	assume	that	due	
to	 chance	 self-regarding	 individuals	 are	 over-represented	 among	 landowners	 in	 this	 local	
population,	but	this	is	not	the	case	among	farmers.	The	over-representation	among	landowners	







not	 generalize.	 Rather,	 the	 extra	 degree	 of	 self-regard	 among	 landowners,	 which	 is	 just	 an	
accident,	separately	biases	norm	evolution	in	both	domains	in	the	same	way.	Landowners	end	up	
privileged	 in	 both	 domains,	 but	 not	 because	 the	 privilege	 in	 sharecropping	 agreements	
generalizes	 to	 social	 encounters	 in	 town.	 Distinguishing	 this	 kind	 of	 mechanism	 from	 norm	
generalization	will	typically	be	difficult	or	 impossible	 in	 field	settings.	 In	principle,	however,	a	
properly	designed	experiment	can	provide	control	over	the	norm	in	the	first	domain,	which	would	
then	allow	the	researcher	 to	 identify	 the	causal	effect	of	 this	norm	generalizing	 to	 the	second	
domain.		
	 Accordingly,	 to	 examine	 the	 evolution	 and	 generalization	 of	 distributional	 norms,	 we	
conducted	 an	 incentivized	 lab-in-the-field	 experiment	 with	 children	 who	 were	 either	 in	
kindergarten	 (5-6	 years)	 or	 second	grade	 (8-9	 years).	 In	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	we	






“suggested	 equilibrium”.	 In	 some	 treatments,	 this	 exogenously	 suggested	 equilibrium	 implied	
inequality,	with	 one	 group	privileged	and	 the	 other	 underprivileged.	 In	 other	 treatments,	 the	












implied	 equality.	However,	when	 the	 suggested	equilibria	 implied	 inequality,	we	 expected	the	
kindergarteners	 to	be	more	 likely	 to	 follow	the	 suggestion	 than	 second-graders.	 In	particular,	












It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 we	 conducted	 our	 experiments	 with	 two	 developmental	 samples,	
kindergarteners	and	second-graders.	




































	 Cleanly	distinguishing	between	these	 two	scenarios	requires	an	approach	 in	which	 the	
researcher	manipulates	normative	information	in	one	decision-making	domain	to	see	how	this	
causes	an	effect	in	some	other	domain	downstream.	This	is	exactly	what	we	did	in	our	experiment,	
but	 this	 approach	 introduces	 another	 difficulty.	 Namely,	 participants	 do	 not	 come	 to	 an	
experiment	 as	 vacant	 recipients	 of	 norm	manipulations;	 they	 come	with	 some	mix	 of	 norms	
already	 in	place	because	of	 a	process	of	 enculturation	 that	has	already	occurred.	Accordingly,	
manipulating	norms	in	a	way	that	is	detectable	in	the	face	of	these	pre-existing	forces	is	potentially	
difficult,	 but	 at	 least	 two	 generic	 strategies	 are	 clear.	 First,	 the	 researcher	 can	 implement	 an	
exceedingly	strong	manipulation.	This	is	fine,	but	in	general	strong	manipulations	risk	inducing	
experimenter	demand	effects	(Orne,	1962).	Second,	 the	researcher	can	work	with	participants	


















could	potentially	use	 to	help	 them	solve	 this	problem	by	explaining	how	previous	people	had	
played	the	same	game.	This	suggestion,	however,	implied	a	privileged	status	for	one	group,	either	
triangles	 or	 circles,	 and	 an	 underprivileged	 status	 for	 the	 other	 group.	 Depending	 on	 the	
treatment,	the	suggested	equilibrium	in	question	was	based	on	either	the	previous	play	of	adults	
or	children.	Past	research	 in	diverse	 fields	has	 identified	 the	 imitation	of	role	models	as	a	key	
mechanism	for	transmitting	social	norms	to	children	(Ben-Ner,	List,	Putterman,	&	Samek,	2017;	
Blake,	 Corbit,	 Callaghan,	 &	Warneken,	 2016;	 Laland	&	 Rendell,	 2019;	 Lew-Levy,	 Lavi,	 Reckin,	
Cristóbal-Azkarate,	&	Ellis-Davies,	2018;	Rushton,	1976).	More	specifically,	while	children	imitate	
their	 peers	 mostly	 for	 social	 reasons,	 namely,	 for	 bonding,	 they	 prefer	 imitating	 adults	 over	
imitating	 peers	 when	 learning,	 and,	 specifically,	 when	 learning	 normative	 content	 (Rakoczy,	
Hamann,	Warneken,	&	Tomasello,	2010;	Zmyj	&	Seehagen,	2013).		













to	 allocate	 resources	 between	 an	 in-group	 member	 and	 an	 out-group	 member.	 Participants	
retained	 their	 group	affiliations	 from	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 but	 the	 two	parts	were	
otherwise	 not	 linked.	 In	 particular,	 the	material	 incentives	 presented	 in	 the	 two	 parts	 of	 the	
experiment	had	no	explicit	connection	to	each	other.	
	 Our	design	allowed	us	to	separate	out	any	effects	related	to	in-group	favoritism.	Our	key	
task	 centered	 around	 identifying	 how	 norms	 from	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment	 shaped	
allocations	 in	 the	 second	 part	 beyond	 any	 biases	 associated	 with	 in-group	 favoritism.	 In	
particular,	 we	 wanted	 to	 examine	 if	 players	 in	 the	 allocation	 game	 would	 favor	 the	 group	
privileged	in	the	first	part	of	the	experiment,	ignore	what	happened	in	the	first	part,	or	favor	the	
group	underprivileged	in	the	first	part.	The	first	of	these	possibilities	is	our	operational	definition	




	 With	 respect	 to	 children,	 we	 know	 that	 fairness	 norms	 governing	 the	 distribution	 of	
resources	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	 culture,	 and	 these	 norms	 develop	 starting	 from	 middle	
childhood	(House,	2018;	House,	Kanngiesser,	Clark	Barrett,	et	al.,	2020;	House	et	al.,	2013;	House	
&	Tomasello,	2018;	Warneken,	2016,	2018).	More	precisely,	it	is	a	universal	pattern	that	before	
middle	 childhood,	 children	 show	no	 costly	 altruism	 (House,	Kanngiesser,	Barrett,	 et	 al.,	 2020;	




2011;	 Fehr	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Starting	 from	 middle	 childhood	 (8-10),	 children’s	 prosocial	 sharing	
increasingly	approximates	the	normative	expectations	prevailing	in	a	specific	society,	which	also	
correspond	to	adult	sharing	behavior	(House,	Kanngiesser,	Barrett,	et	al.,	2020;	House	et	al.,	2013;	
House	 &	 Tomasello,	 2018;	 Kogut,	 2012).	 It	 is	 only	 starting	 from	 this	 age,	 that	 advantageous	
inequity	 aversion	 is	 emerging,	 and	 it	 is	 emerging	 only	 in	 some	 societies	 (Blake	 et	 al.,	 2015).	












weak	 pre-existing	 fairness	 norms	 in	 the	 younger	 age	 group,	 the	 kindergarteners,	would	 lead	
players	 to	 generalize	 such	 norms	 to	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 This	 means	 all	
kindergarteners,	whatever	their	group	affiliation,	would	extend	privilege	from	the	first	part	of	the	
experiment	to	the	second	part	by	giving	more	to	members	of	the	previously	privileged	group.	This	
is	 the	 generalization	 hypothesis.	 It	 applies	 both	 to	 those	 privileged	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	









































not	 vary	 from	 one	 session	 to	 another.	 Altogether,	 a	 session	 consisted	 12	 periods	 of	 an	 anti-
coordination	game	that	varied	by	treatment,	followed	by	an	allocation	game	that	never	varied.	
This	paradigm	allowed	us	 to	 isolate	 the	 two	primary	questions	of	 interest.	 First,	 how	did	our	
treatments	shape	the	coordination	norms	that	evolved	during	repeated	play	of	a	bargaining	game	
with	or	without	 the	potential	 to	 create	 systematic	 inequality?	 Second,	 to	what	 extent	did	 any	
coordination	norms	that	evolved	spill	over	to	affect	choices	in	a	subsequent	game	with	material	
incentives	unrelated	to	the	first	game?		






information	 other	 than	 their	 group	 affiliations,	 and	 thus	 they	 could	 not	 know	 the	 specific	
individual	with	whom	they	were	playing	at	any	given	point	in	time.	
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two	 pure-strategy	 equilibria	 was	 focal.	 Suggested	 equilibria	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 facilitate	
coordination	 under	 both	 the	 asymmetric	 and	 the	 symmetric	 treatments,	 but	 under	 the	
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Fig. 1. Anti-coordination game. Both versions of the game have two pure-strategy equilibria, with each 
equilibrium requiring the players to choose different behaviors. In this sense, we have two versions of 
an “anti-coordination” game. a In the asymmetric treatment, successful coordination yields unequal 
payoffs, with one pure-strategy equilibrium favoring triangles, and the other favoring circles. b In the 
symmetric treatment, in contrast, successful coordination always yields equal payoffs. 
	
	





children	 and	 adults	 provided	 the	 basis	 for	 our	 final	 treatment	 dimension.	 In	 the	 child-
demonstrators	treatment,	we	communicated	the	descriptive	norm	by	referring	to	the	fact	that	










Table 1. Design and participant numbers by age and treatment 












































































































Total   33 326 4228 100 
Note: Conditional on implementing sessions with kindergarteners or second-graders we randomly 
assigned treatments to sessions subject to a stratification scheme that maintained an approximately 
equal number of sessions per treatment. Observations refer to decisions made in the first part (12 
periods) and the second part (1 period) of the experiment, with the exception of 



















the	 most	 expensive	 toys	 had	 values	 of	 approximately	 30	 Swiss	 Francs.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	
























Fig. 2. a A network of 11 laptops (one experimenter/server and 10 subjects/clients) was set up in each 
classroom. b A toy store was set up in the back of the school class for each session. The toy store 
included age-appropriate toys for girls and boys. We grouped toys into three price categories ranging 
from 10 to 30 CHF. Thus, the toys effectively had different prices, and the children could freely spend 
the gold coins they earned during the experiment subject to the constraint that a participant could not 
buy a toy she could not afford. Even though choices were incentivized in this way, we scaled payoffs 





experimenter	manually	 controlled	 an	 animated	 demonstration	 of	 the	 experiment	 so	 that	 the	
spoken	 instructions	 and	 the	 animated	 demonstration	 progressed	 in	 parallel.	 In	 effect,	 as	 the	




feature	 ensured	 that	 we	 could	 always	 progress	 through	 the	 spoken	 instructions	 and	 the	
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demonstration	 in	 synchrony.	 Moreover,	 the	 demonstration	 also	 acquainted	 participants	 with	
exactly	the	same	screens	they	would	encounter	during	the	experiment	proper.	




play	 the	game	once,	players	would	be	randomly	paired.	To	represent	random	pairing,	 the	 five	
circle	players	spun	around	like	a	wheel,	while	the	five	triangle	players	did	the	same	(Fig.	3a).	After	
a	 few	 seconds	 of	 this,	 the	 focal	 player	 and	 her	 partner	 zoomed	 to	 the	 foreground,	 and	 the	
remaining	players	faded	away	(Fig.	3b).	For	the	game	itself,	each	player	had	to	choose	a	basket	
(Fig.	3b).	If	the	two	chose	different	baskets,	each	would	receive	the	gold	coins	in	their	respective	
























Fig. 3. Anti-coordination game. a At the beginning of each of the twelve periods of the anti-
coordination game, the groups (circles and triangles) of players spin in two circles, an animated 
representation of random partner matching. b A focal player (with red lines) and a randomly chosen 
partner ready to play. c Successful coordination, where in this example the circle player chooses up 
and gets two coins, while the triangle player chooses down and gets one. d Miscoordination, where 
in this example both players choose up and neither player gets any payoff. 
	






of	 the	 circle	players.	A	 sticker	on	 the	 right	 of	 the	keyboard	had	an	analogous	 triangle.	Before	
beginning	 the	 anti-coordination	 game,	 we	 checked	 understanding.	 In	 particular,	 we	 asked	
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participants	 to	 choose	 the	 upper	 basket,	 the	 lower	 basket,	 to	 press	 the	 key	 with	 the	 sticker	
representing	the	in-group,	and	to	press	the	key	with	the	sticker	representing	the	out-group.	When	
a	participant	chose	correctly	during	these	tests,	a	sun	appeared	on	her	screen.	Otherwise,	no	sun	
appeared,	 and	 an	 experimenter	 would	 discuss	 the	 instructions	 further	 with	 the	 child.	 This	
happened	one	time	per	class,	on	average.	Besides	a	test	of	whether	the	children	understood	how	
to	 choose	 a	 specific	 basket,	 and	 whether	 they	 knew	 their	 group-membership,	 no	 further	
comprehension	checks	were	conducted.	The	coordination	game,	however,	was	played	repeatedly	
for	twelve	periods.	We	expected	that	repeated	play,	combined	with	regular	feedback	about	the	




Electronic	 Supplementary	Material	 C	 for	 original	 instructions	 in	 Swiss	 German	 and	 D	 for	 an	
English	 translation).	To	 translate,	 the	 experimenter	 said,	 “Recently,	we	played	 this	 game	with	
grown-ups/children.	 The	 grown-ups/children	 played	 the	 game	 like	 this.	 The	 triangle	 (circle)	
group	usually	chose	 the	upper	basket	with	one/two	gold	coins,	and	 the	circle	(triangle)	group	




















































Fig. 4. Resource allocation game. In the second stage of the experiment, each subject split three coins 














with	 95%	 CI	 of	 [0.345,0.496];	 second-graders:	 0.456	 with	 95%	 CI	 of	 [0.340,0.578]).	 Those	





a       b 
 
	
Fig. 5. Compliance in anti-coordination games across treatment conditions. Graphs show the 
dynamics of the proportion complying by treatment for kindergartners (a) and second-graders (b). We 
define compliance as an individual choice in accord with our suggestion about how to play the game 
at the beginning of Part 1. “Adult” refers to adult demonstrators and “child” to child demonstrators. 
Each subject is a member of a group, which is, according to this treatment, either privileged 
(asymmetric), underprivileged (asymmetric), or equal (symmetric). See Table 1 for the numbers of 





















































Compliance by treatments, second−graders
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advantageous	 inequity	 aversion	 (Fehr	&	Schmidt,	 1999).	An	alternative	 explanation	 for	 lower	
norm	adherence	in	asymmetric	treatments	is	the	higher	complexity	of	this	treatment	–	although,	










    
Second-grade, child, equal groups 0.825 0.713 0.937 
Second-grade, child, unequal groups 0.665 0.492 0.838 
Second-grade, adult, equal groups 0.895 0.714 1.076 
Second-grade, adult, unequal groups 0.535 0.468 0.602 
Kindergarten, child, equal groups 0.622 0.574 0.670 
Kindergarten, child, unequal groups 0.472 0.405 0.539 
Kindergarten, adult, equal groups 0.670 0.518 0.822 
Kindergarten, adult, unequal groups 0.420 0.364 0.476 
 
Note: Predictive margins of compliance derived from a full factorial logit model over the 12 periods of 
the anti-coordination game. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the 














	 To	 recap,	 our	 treatment	 dimensions	 include	 adult	 demonstrators	 versus	 child	
demonstrators,	 the	 symmetric	 treatment	 versus	 the	 asymmetric	 treatment,	 and	 a	 descriptive	




Under	 the	 symmetric	 treatment,	 the	 suggested	 equilibrium	 implied	 equal	 status	 regardless	 of	
which	 equilibrium	 we	 suggested,	 which	 meant	 the	 suggestion	 only	 served	 as	 a	 coordination	
device.	 Our	 task	 is	 to	 examine	 how	 compliance	 rates	 depended	 jointly	 on	 the	 demonstrators,	
suggested	 relative	 group	 status,	 and	 the	 age	 (kindergarteners	 versus	 second-graders)	 of	 the	
participant.	
	 To	 avoid	 a	 profusion	 of	 three-way	 interactions,	 we	 work	 with	 dummy	 variables	 that	













asymmetric	 and	 the	 suggested	 equilibrium	 followed	 from	 the	 prior	 play	 of	 adults	 (Table	 3,	





-1.792,	 z	 =	 -2.97,	 P	 =	 0.003,	 CI	 [-2.975,	 -0.608]).	 Importantly,	 however,	 this	 reduction	 in	






direct	 contrast	 to	 the	 hypothesis,	 adult	 demonstrators	 significantly	 reduced	 compliance	 in	
asymmetric	 treatments	 in	 the	 older	 age	 group	 (Table	 3,	 linear	 combinations	
Child/underprivileged	 vs.	 Adult/underprivileged,	 c2	 =	 3.92,	 P	 =	 0.048;	 Child/privileged	 vs.	
Adult/privileged,	c2	=	3.92,	P	=	0.048).	Also	inconsistent	with	the	hypothesis,	when	the	game	was	
symmetric,	 compliance	did	not	differ	between	 child	 and	adult	 demonstrators	 (Child/equal	 vs.	
Adult/equal,	c2	=	0.08,	P	=	0.	775).	The	pattern	is	similar,	although	less	clear,	for	the	younger	age	
group,	with	zero	effects	in	equal	groups	(Child/equal	vs.	Adult/equal,	c2	=	0.010,	P	=	0.94)	and	in	
underprivileged	 groups	 (linear	 combinations	 Kindergarten	 x	 Child/underprivileged	 vs.	
Kindergarten	 x	 Adult/underprivileged,	 c2	 =	 0.26,	 P	 =	 0.6102)	 and	 a	 statistically	 insignificant	
tendency	for	lower	compliance	of	the	privileged	under	adult	compared	to	child	demonstrators	





















twelve	periods	provide	 evidence	 against	 the	hypothesis	 that	adult	demonstrators	should	hold	
more	sway	than	child	demonstrators.	Specifically,	testing	the	relevant	linear	combinations	show	
that	adult	demonstrators	had	no	 effect	 on	 compliance	 in	 symmetric	 treatments	(test	 of	 linear	
combinations	Child/equal	 vs.	Adult/equal,	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 session-level:	c2	 =	





	 In	 sum,	 high	 compliance	 rates	 in	 symmetric	 treatments	 (Table	 2)	 show	 that	 both	
kindergartners	 and	 second-graders	 understood	 how	 to	 use	 the	 suggested	 equilibrium	 as	 a	
coordination	device.	They	often	chose,	however,	to	reduce	their	compliance	with	the	suggested	
equilibrium	 in	 asymmetric	 treatments,	 treatments	 in	 which	 compliance	 produced	 inequality	
between	 the	 two	 groups.	 This	 reduced	 compliance	 was	 especially	 robust	 among	 subjects	
underprivileged	by	the	suggested	equilibrium	(Table	3).	Moreover,	while	the	same	tendency	was	

































 Compliance in Period 1 Compliance in Periods 1-12 
     
Kindergarten -0.758 -0.780 -0.873* -0.872* 
 (-1.51) (-1.55) (-2.36) (-2.36) 
     
Adult/equal 0.164 0.172 0.402 0.402 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.53) (0.53) 
     
Adult/underprivileged -1.186* -1.155 -1.771*** -1.773*** 
 (-1.98) (-1.92) (-4.67) (-4.67) 
     
Adult/privileged -1.186* -1.183* -0.871* -0.871* 
 (-1.98) (-1.97) (-2.36) (-2.37) 
     
Child/underprivileged -1.792** -1.849** -1.383** -1.380** 
 (-2.97) (-3.04) (-2.81) (-2.82) 
     
Child/privileged 0.348 0.370 -0.345 -0.346 
 (0.47) (0.50) (-0.66) (-0.66) 
     
Kindergarten x Adult/equal 0.0544 0.0602 -0.319 -0.319 
 (0.07) (0.08) (-0.39) (-0.39) 
     
Kindergarten x Adult/underprivileged -0.455 -0.471 0.649 0.650 
 (-0.51) (-0.53) (1.61) (1.62) 
     
Kindergarten x Adult/ privileged 1.569 1.571 0.255 0.256 
 (1.76) (1.76) (0.63) (0.64) 
     
Kindergarten x Child/underprivileged 1.739* 1.847* 0.683 0.676 
 (2.18) (2.30) (1.30) (1.29) 
     
Kindergarten x Child/privileged -0.736 -0.764 0.141 0.143 
 (-0.82) (-0.85) (0.26) (0.26) 
     
Period   0.00873 0.00873 
   (0.83) (0.83) 
     
Female  0.282  -0.0197 
  (1.12)  (-0.21) 
     
Constant 1.386*** 1.258** 1.343*** 1.352*** 
 (3.51) (3.06) (3.76) (3.74) 
     
N 326 326 3912 3912 
 
Table 3. Compliance with the suggested equilibrium. Binary logit model. Compliance (1) is the 
dependent variable. N refers to either (i) the number of participants for analyses restricted to the first 
period (columns 1 and 2) or (ii) to the total number of decisions for analyses using data from all 12 
periods (columns 3 and 4). For models analyzing all periods, robust standard errors are based on 
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clustering at the session level. z statistics in parentheses. See Table A1 in the electronic supplement 





	 Norm	 generalization	 predicts	 that,	 among	 kindergarteners,	 privileged	 status	 in	 the	
asymmetric	treatment	becomes	normatively	acceptable	and	thus	spills	over	to	shape	behavior	in	
the	subsequent	resource	allocation	game.	We	examine	this	idea	in	two	different	ways	based	on	





raises	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 group	 favored	 by	 the	 suggested	 equilibrium	 actually	 ended	 up	
earning	less	on	average	than	the	disfavored	group.	In	this	way,	realized	privilege	was	endogenous,	
and	the	associated	definition	of	privilege	only	allows	a	correlational	analysis.	It	should	be	noted	
that	 in	 Part	 2,	 our	 hypotheses	 (compensation	 hypothesis	 and	 generalization	 hypothesis)	






a	 stratification	 scheme	 (Fig.	 6a).	 As	 explained	 above,	 compliance	 rates	 under	 the	 symmetric	
treatment	were	significantly	above	chance	for	both	kindergarteners	and	second-graders.	Under	





the	 estimated	 effect	 would	 be	 causal.	 Altogether,	 exogenous	 privilege,	 or	 exogenous	 (group)	










we	 analyze	 the	 effect	 of	 endogenous	 privilege	 in	 the	 anti-coordination	 game	 on	 play	 in	 the	
resource	allocation	game,	the	estimated	effect	is	correlational.	Altogether,	endogenous	privilege	
captures	three	different	types	of	group	status.	Either	the	groups	played	the	symmetric	game,	in	
which	 case	 they	 were	 necessarily	 equal,	 or	 they	 played	 the	 asymmetric	 game,	 in	 which	 case	
endogenous	 choices	 yielded	 a	 privileged	 group	 and	 an	 underprivileged	 group.	 Refer	 to	










interaction	 terms	 kindergarten	 x	 adult/underprivileged,	 kindergarten	 x	 adult/privileged,	
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kindergarten	x	child/underprivileged,	kindergarten	x	child	privileged,	as	these	terms	will	tell	us,	
whether	 the	 younger	 age	 group	 generalized	 inequity	 from	 the	 anti-coordination	 game	 to	 the	
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Fig. 6. Average number of coins allocated to the in-group member by treatment condition and age 
group. a Exogenous group status. b Endogenous group status. 
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group	 affiliates,	who	 shared	 their	 underprivileged	 status.	 This	 result,	 of	 course,	 is	 exactly	 the	
opposite	of	norm	generalization.		
	 Concerning	endogenous	status,	as	before	we	find	a	positive	effect	associated	with	
Child/underprivileged	 (b	=	 2.00,	 t	 =	2.07,	 P=	0.047,	 CI	 [0.003,	 0.397]).	 In	 addition,	we	 find	 a	
positive	 effect	 associated	with	 Adult/underprivileged	 (b	 =	2.00,	 t	 =	 2.07,	 P=	0.047,	 CI	 [0.003,	




underprivileged	 groups	 do	 not	 significantly	 differ	 from	 equal	 groups	 when	 allocating	 coins.	
Interestingly,	 the	 qualitative	 pattern	 is	 the	 opposite	 of	 that	 among	 second-graders,	 but	 the	
evidence	for	generalizing	endogenous	privilege	among	kindergarteners	was	not	significant	(test	
of	 linear	 combinations,	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 session-level,	 Kindergarten	 x	
Child/privileged	 vs.	 Kindergarten	 x	 Child/equal:	 F	 =	 2.57,	 P=0.119;	 Kindergarten	 x	
Adult/privileged	vs.	Kindergarten	 x	Adult/equal:	 F	=	1.23,	 p	=	0.2769;	 see	Tables	B1	and	B2,	
Electronic	 Supplementary	 Material,	 for	 more	 information).	 Altogether,	 endogenously	
underprivileged	 second-graders	 compensated	 their	 underprivileged	 group	 affiliates,	 while	
kindergarteners	neither	compensated	for	nor	generalized	endogenous	status.	These	results	are	
consistent	with	 the	 notion	 that	 development	 of	 internalized	 fairness	 norms	 is	 still	 underway	






Again,	 we	 find	 a	 tendency	 for	 the	 underprivileged	 to	 allocate	 more	 to	 the	 in-group.	 With	







with	 respect	 to	 adults	 this	 effect	 does	 not	 reach	 statistical	 significance	 under	 all	 model	






 Exogenous group status Endogenous group status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Kindergarten 0.161 0.164 0.161 0.164 
 (1.40) (1.43) (1.40) (1.43) 
     
Adult/equal 0.200 0.197 0.200 0.197 
 (1.73) (1.69) (1.73) (1.70) 
     
Adult/underprivileged 0.1000 0.0837 0.200* 0.186 
 (0.63) (0.53) (2.07) (1.92) 
     
Adult/privileged 0.200 0.197 0.1000 0.0972 
 (1.65) (1.65) (0.57) (0.55) 
     
Child/underprivileged 0.200* 0.223* 0.200* 0.203* 
 (2.07) (2.41) (2.07) (2.05) 
     
Child/privileged -0.150 -0.160 -0.150 -0.142 
 (-0.81) (-0.89) (-0.81) (-0.77) 
     
Kindergarten x Adult/equal -0.136 -0.133 -0.136 -0.133 
 (-0.67) (-0.64) (-0.67) (-0.65) 
     
Kindergarten x Adult/underprivileged 0.122 0.134 -0.444 -0.427 
 (0.66) (0.71) (-1.32) (-1.31) 
     
Kindergarten x Adult/privileged -0.444 -0.437 0.122 0.121 
 (-1.29) (-1.33) (0.61) (0.60) 
     
Kindergarten x Child/underprivileged -0.111 -0.152 -0.351 -0.356 
 (-0.45) (-0.62) (-1.42) (-1.48) 
     
Kindergarten x Child privileged 0.159 0.176 0.399 0.384 
 (0.56) (0.62) (1.60) (1.55) 
     
Female  -0.130  -0.113 
  (-1.59)  (-1.54) 
     
Constant 1.950*** 2.012*** 1.950*** 2.003*** 
 (22.74) (20.73) (22.74) (21.00) 
     
N 316 316 316 316 
Table 4. Allocation to in-group. OLS regression. Sum of coins allocated to the in-group depending on 
group status (Models 1 and 2: exogeneous group status. Models 3 and 4: endogenous group status). 
Cluster-robust standard errors. N refers to the number of participants. z statistics in parentheses. * p 












we	 developed	 an	 accessible	 video	 game	 that	 allowed	 young	 children	 to	 repeatedly	 play	 an	
incentivized	anti-coordination	game.	Using	this	novel	approach,	we	find	that	both	kindergarteners	
and	second-graders	used	 information	about	how	others	had	played	 the	game,	 information	we	
manipulated	exogenously	(called	“suggested	equilibrium”),	to	improve	coordination.	Specifically,	




	 In	contrast,	 in	the	asymmetric	 treatment,	 the	equilibria	we	suggested	 implied	a	way	of	
playing	the	game	that	would	have	created	one	privileged	group	and	one	underprivileged	group.	
Interestingly,	 in	 this	 case	both	 groups	disregarded	 the	 suggestion	we	provided,	which	 in	 turn	
limited	the	extent	to	which	robust	coordination	norms	formed	and	persisted.		
As	an	alternative	explanation	to	consciously	disregarding	the	inequitable	suggestion,	the	





















from	 the	 endogenously	privileged	group	nor	kindergartners	 compensated	 for	underprivileged	
status	in	the	same	way.	
	 In	 addition,	 no	 group	 of	 participants	 generalized	 privilege,	 whether	 exogenous	 or	
endogenous,	 from	 the	 anti-coordination	 game	 with	 asymmetric	 payoffs	 to	 the	 subsequent	







resource	 allocation	 game.	 All	 in	 all,	 though	 some	 participants	 compensated	 for	 endogenous	
underprivilege,	 no	 group	 of	 participants	 perpetuated	 advantage,	 whether	 exogenous	 or	
endogenous,	 by	 carrying	 it	 over	 from	 the	 asymmetric	 anti-coordination	game	 to	 the	 resource	
allocation	game.	
	 While	previous	studies	have	found	that	preschoolers	favor	in-group	members	over	out-



















relatively	 weak	 among	 kindergarteners.	 The	 results	 from	 our	 repeated	 asymmetric	 anti-
coordination	game	 do	not	 support	 this	 idea.	 However,	 in	 the	 resource	 allocation	 game	 in	 the	
second	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 only	 the	 second-graders	 actively	 compensated	 their	
underprivileged	group	affiliates.	This	is	consistent	with	our	expectation	that	the	older	children	
would	 come	 to	 the	 experiment	 with	 more	 strongly	 developed	 fairness	 norms	 than	 the	
kindergarteners.	Interestingly,	the	difference	here	could	arise	from	the	locus	of	inequality	in	the	
two	 parts	 of	 the	 experiment.	 Specifically,	 in	 the	 anti-coordination	 game,	 choices	 potentially	
created	inequality	with	respect	to	a	focal	decision	maker	and	her	partner.	In	this	sense,	fairness	
pertained	 to	 ego-centered	 inequality.	 In	 the	 resource	 allocation	 game,	 the	 decision	 maker	
allocated	coins	to	an	in-group	member	and	an	out-group	member.	The	decision	maker’s	choices	
did	not	affect	her	own	payoffs,	and	in	this	sense	fairness	pertained	to	group	affiliation	without	
being	 ego-centered.	 This	 suggests	 the	 possibility	 that	 ego-centered	 fairness	 concerns	 might	


















we	might	expect	 the	evolution	of	social	 learning	strategies	 that	preferentially	attend	 to	adults	
(Kelly	&	Hoburg,	2017;	Richerson	&	Boyd,	2020).	Interestingly,	recent	observational	data	from	
small-scale	societies	(e.g.,	Lew-Levy	et	al.,	2019),	and	recent	experimental	data	(Misch	&	Dunham,	







	 We	 started	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 when	 bargaining	 coordination	 incentives	 can	 create	
pressure	for	individuals	to	coalesce	around	shared	expectations.	Once	shared	expectations	are	in	
 42 
place,	 they	 provide	 people	 with	 a	 coordination	 device	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 norm,	 which	 limits	
miscoordination	and	improves	welfare.	At	the	same	time,	a	norm	can	privilege	some	groups	at	the	










miscoordinating,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 population,	 pre-existing	 power	




homogeneity,	 and	norms	 readily	 evolved	and	 stabilized.	This	 shows	 that	 even	young	 children	
making	decentralized	choices	can	quickly	recognize	and	embrace	a	new	norm	when	heterogeneity	
is	 not	 getting	 in	 the	 way.	 Our	 asymmetric	 treatment,	 however,	 instantiated	 a	 form	 of	
heterogeneity	that	did	get	in	the	way,	and	this	simple	change	destabilized	norm	adherence	and	
persistence.	In	addition,	second-graders	compensated	the	underprivileged	when	given	the	chance	










said,	 we	 also	 know	 that	 individuals	 vary,	 and	 in	 particular	 empirical	 research	 on	 cultural	
transmission	clearly	shows	that	individuals	vary	in	terms	of	how	they	learn	from	others	(Efferson,	
Lalive,	 Richerson,	 McElreath,	 &	 Lubell,	 2008;	 Goeree	 &	 Yariv,	 2015;	 Mesoudi,	 Chang,	 Dall,	 &	
















headmasters,	 and	 educational	 authorities	 involved	 for	 their	 kind	 support	
(Bildungsdirektion	Kanton	Zürich,	Departement	Bildung	Kanton	Aargau,	Bildungs-	und	
Kulturdepartement	Kanton	Luzern).	
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